"T 


University  of  California  •  Berkeley 


GENERAL  GRANT'S 


elitical  -f 


By    SKNE^X. 


EVOLUTION  OF  MYTH 

AS  EXEMPLIFIED  IN- 
GENERAL  GRANT'S   HISTORY  OF  THE   PLOT  OF 
PRESIDENT  POLK  AND  SECRETARY  MARCY 
TO     SACRIFICE     TWO     AMERICAN 
ARMIES  IN  THE  MEXICAN 
WAR  OF  1846-48. 


13Y 


WASHINGTON,   D.   C. 

WIIJ4AM    H.    MORRISON. 

1890, 


nil 


e  ji£©luti©n  ©f 


THE  MYTH. 

In  the  Personal  Memoirs  of  General  Grant, 
volume  i,  chapter  9,  under  the  heading  of  "  Polit 
ical  Intrigue, ' '  are  found  the  following  paragraphs : 

"The  Mexican  War  was  a  political  war,  and 
the  administration  conducting  it  desired  to  make 
political  capital  out  of  it.  General  Scott  was  at 
the  head  of  the  Army,  and  being  a  soldier  of  ac 
knowledged  professional  capacity,  his  claim  to  the 
command  of  the  forces  in  the  field  was  almost  un- 
disputable,  and  does  not  seem  to  have  been  denied 
by  President  Polk,  or  Marcy  his  Secretary  of  War. 
Scott  was  whig,  and  the  administration  was  demo 
cratic.  General  Scott  was  also  known  to  have 
political  aspirations,  and  nothing  so  popularizes  a 
candidate  for  high  civil  position  as  military  vic 
tories.  It  would  not  do  therefore  to  give  him  com 
mand  of  the  'Army  of  Invasion.'  The  plans  sub 
mitted  by  Scott  for  a  campaign  in  Mexico  were 
disapproved  by  the  administration,  and  he  replied 
in  a  tone,  possibly  a  little  disrespectful,  to  the 
effect  that  if  a  soldier's  plans  were  not  to  be  sup 
ported  by  the  administration,  success  could  not  be 
expected.  This  was  on  the  2/th  of  May,  1846, 


/Ve  BK1 


4  The  Evolution  of  Myth. 

Four  days  later  he  (General  Scott)  was  notified  that 
he  need  not  go  to  Mexico.  General  Gaines  was 
next  in  rank,  but  he  was  too  old  and  feeble  to  take 
the  field.  Colonel  Zachary  Taylor  a  Brigadier 
General  by  brevet  was  therefore  left  in  command. 
He  too  was  a  whig  but  was  not  supposed  to  enter 
tain  any  political  aspiration;  nor  did  he;  but  after 
the  fall  of  Monterey,  his  third  battle  and  third 
complete  victory,  the  whig  papers  at  home  began 
to  speak  of  him  as  the  candidate  of  their  party  for 
the  presidency.  Something  had  to  be  done  to 
neutralize  his  growing  popularity.  He  could  not 
be  relieved  from  duty  in  the  field  where  all  his 
battles  had  been  victories;  the  design  would  have 
been  too  transparent.  It  was  finally  decided  to 
send  General  Scott  to  Mexico  in  chief  command, 
and  to  authorize  him  to  carry  out  his  own  original 
plan — that  is  to  capture  Vera  Cruz  and  march  upon 
the  capital  of  the  country.  It  was  no  doubt  sup 
posed  that  Scott's  ambition  would  lead  him  to 
slaughter  Taylor  or  destroy  his  chances  for  the 
presidency,  and  yet  it  was  hoped  that  he  would 
not  make  sufficient  capital  himself  to  secure  the 
prize. 

"The  administration  had  indeed  a  most  em 
barrassing  problem  to  solve.  It  was  engaged  in  a 
war  of  conquest  'which  must  be  carried  to  a  suc 
cessful  issue  or  the  political  object  would  be  tin- 
attained.  Yet  all  the  capable  officers  of  the  requi 
site  rank  belonged  to  the  opposition,  and  the  man 
selected  for  his  lack  of  political  ambition  had  him 
self  become  a  prominent  candidate  for  the  presi 
dency.  It  was  necessary  to  destroy  his  chances 
promptly.  The  fact  is,  the  administration  of  Mr. 
Polk  made  every  preparation  to  disgrace  General 


The  Evolution  of  Myth.  5 

Scott,  or,  to  speak  more  correctly,  to  drive  him  to 
such  desperation  that  he  would  disgrace  himself. 
General  Scott  had  opposed  conquest  by  the  way  of 
the  Rio  Grande,  Matamoras  and  Saltillo  from  the 
first.  Now  that  he  was  in  command  of  all  the 
forces  in  Mexico,  he  withdrew  from  Taylor  most 
of  his  regular  troops  and  left  him  only  enough 
volunteers,  as  he  thought,  to  hold  the  line  then  in 
possession  of  the  invading  army.  Indeed  Scott 
did  not  deem  it  important  to  hold  anything  beyond 
the  Rio  Grande,  and  authorized  Taylor  to  fall  back 
to  that  line  if  he  chose.  Taylor  protested  against 
the  depletion  of  his  army,  and  his  subsequent 
movement  upon  Buena  Vista  would  indicate  that 
he  did  not  share  the  views  of  his  chief  in  regard 
to  the  unimportance  of  conquest  beyond  the  Rio 
Grande. 

' '  Scott  had  estimated  the  men  and  material  that 
would  be  required  to  capture  Vera  Cruz  and  to 
march  on  the  capital  of  the  country,  260  miles 
in  the  interior.  He  was  promised  all  he  asked, 
and  seemed  to  have  not  only  the  confidence  of  the 
President,  but  his  sincere  good  wishes.  The 
promises  were  all  broken.  Only  about  half  the 
troops  were  furnished  that  had  been  pledged,  other 
war  material  was  withheld,  and  Scott  had  scarcely 
started  for  Mexico  before  the  President  undertook 
to  supersede  him  by  the  appointment  of  Senator 
Thomas  H.  Benton  as  Lieutenant  General.  This 
being  refused  by  Congress,  the  President  asked 
legislative  authority  to  place  a  junior  over  a  senior 
of  the  same  grade,  with  a  view  of  appointing  Ben- 
ton  to  the  rank  of  Major  General,  and  then  placing 
him  in  command  of  the  army;  but  Congress  failed 
to  accede  to  this  proposition  as  well,  and  Scott  re- 


6  77ie  Evolution  of  Myth. 

mained  in  command;  but  every  General  appointed 
to  serve  under  him  was  politically  opposed  to  the 
chief,  and  several  were  personally  hostile." 

In  the  next  chapter  it  is  said: 

"General  Scott  had  less  than  12,000  men  at 
Vera  Cruz.  He  had  been  promised  by  the  admin 
istration  a  very  much  larger  force,  or  claimed  that 
he  had,  and  he  was  a  man  of  veracity." 

And  again: 

u  It  was  very  important  to  get  the  army  away 
from  Vera  Cruz  as  soon  as  possible  in  order  to 
avoid  the  yellow  fever  or  vomito,  which  usually 
visits  that  city  early  in  the  year  and  is  very  fatal 
to  persons  not  acclimated." 


There  might  be  some  uncertainty  as  to  what  is 
meant  by  slaughtering  Taylor  and  disgracing  Scott, 
if  it  were  not  rendered  clear  by  the  means  used  to 
effect  these  objects.  Taylor  and  Scott  were  to  be 
deprived  of  half  the  troops  which  the  one  had, 
and  the  other  counted  on.  This  explanation  dis 
pels  all  ambiguity.  For  unless  it  was  the  purpose 
of  the  administration  to  enhance  the  glory  of  these 
commanders  by  forcing  them  to  win  great  victories 
with  small  armies,  its  only  purpose  must  have 
been  to  have  them  defeated.  In  no  other  way 
could  the  diminution  of  his  army  in  the  face  of 
an  advancing  enemy  destroy  Taylor's  prospects 


The  Evolution  of  Myth.  7 

for  the  presidency,  or  the  withholding  of  rein 
forcements  from  Scott,  after  he  had  landed  at  Vera 
Cruz,  prevent  him  from  making  political  capital 
by  victory. 

The  story  of  this  enormous  wickedness,  the  more 
enormous,  that  it  was  planned  long  in  advance  and 
involved  the  destruction  of  ten  thousand  men  with 
the  principal  victim  who  was  to  be  lured  to  his 
death  by  hypocritical  professions  of  confidence  and 
good  wishes,  is  told  with  a  circumstantiality  and 
fullness  of  detail  that  to  most  readers  will  supply 
the  place  of  proof.  And  it  draws  from  the  narrator 
not  a  single  expression  of  indignation  or  even  of 
disapproval. 


Mr.  Polk  had  been  honored  by  the  direct  votes 
of  the  people  of  his  State  and  of  the  whole  country, 
with  the  highest  offices,  legislative  and  executive. 
Mr.  Marcy  had  been  a  Judge  of  the  Supreme  Court 
of  his  State,  Governor  of  the  State,  Senator  of  the 
United  States,  and  member  of  two  cabinets,  as 
Secretary  of  War  and  Secretary  of  State,  and  yet, 
says  his  biographer,  his  "crowning  virtue  was  his 
incorruptible  integrity. ' '  These  men  had  lived  all 
their  lives  in  the  fierce  light  of  political  life,  and 
had  gone  to  the  grave  honored  and  respected  by 
all.  And  twenty  years  after  the  death  of  the  last 
survivor  we  are  told  by  a  President  of  the  United 


8  The  Evolution  of  Myth. 

States,  that  these  men  had  prostituted  their  high 
offices,  had  violated  their  oaths,  and  had  conspired 
the  defeat  and  destruction  of  the  armies  which 
they  had  sent  to  war  in  a  foreign  land,  and  all  to 
advance  the  interests  of  their  party  at  home  ! 

That  such  a  tale  should  be  told  at  all  is  to  be 
deplored,  not  only  because  it  is  false,  but  because, 
though  it  be  false,  it  will  tend  powerfully  to  en 
courage  political  depravity.  The  vulgar  villian 
needs  no  encouragement,  or,  if  he  does,  will  find 
it  in  the  creed  of  his  class,  that  "they  all  do  it," 
and  wants  no  proof  that  all  men  are  alike  corrupt. 
But  those  are  more  numerous  who  have  some  re 
gard  for  virtue,  some  belief  in  disinterested  patriot 
ism,  and  who  might  shrink  from  voting  for  a 
scheme  to  plunder  the  public  or  from  counting 
out  an  elected  candidate,  were  there  not  held  up 
before  their  eyes  the  example  of  men  like  Polk 
and  Marcy,  honored  and  esteemed,  who  yet  had 
sacrificed  conscience,  violated  duty,  and  perjured 
their  souls  for  the  good  of  their  party. 

And  then  surely,  no  more  damaging  charge  was 
ever  brought  against  free  institutions  than  that  the 
elect  of  the  people  entered  into  a  plot  to  sacrifice 
the  welfare  of  his  country  and  the  lives  of  ten 
thousand  of  his  fellow-citizens  in  order  to  rid  him 
self  of  a  political  rival.  I  venture  to  say  no  heredi 
tary  monarch  ever  did  the  like;  and  if  a  President 
of  the  United  States  has  done  this,  he  has  supplied 


The  Evolution  of  Myth.  9 

an  unanswerable  argument  to  those  who  maintain 
that,  according  to  the  experience  of  all  ages  and 
all  countries,  patriotism  will  never  long  continue 
to  rise  superior  to  the  rage  of  party  spirit  and  the 
allurements  of  ambition;  and  that  only  a  hereditary 
ruler,  whose  fortunes  and  those  of  his  children  are 
indissolubly  bound  up  with  those  of  his  country, 
can  be  relied  on  for  unswerving  devotion  to  its 
honor  and  interests. 


Of  course  the  charge  is  not  true — could  not  be. 
For  if  Taylor's  army  had  been  overwhelmed  at 
Buena  Vista,  or  Scott's  had  perished  of  vomito 
while  unable  to  get  into  Vera  Cruz  for  want  of  a 
siege  train,  or  out  of  it  for  want  of  reinforcements, 
the  u  war  of  conquest  which  must  be  carried  to  a 
successful  issue"  would  have  failed  and  the  politi 
cal  object  have  been  unattained.  A  more  absurd 
story  could  not  have  been  invented  than  that  Polk 
and  Marcy  expected  to  conquer  Mexico  with  the 
armies  -of  Scott  and  Taylor,  and  at  the  same  time 
withhold  absolutely  necessary  reinforcements  and 
supplies  in  order  that  the  two  generals  should  be 
slaughtered  or  disgraced.  In  a  violent  letter 
which  General  Scott,  after  the  campaign,  addressed 
to  Governor  Marcy  (No.  43),  he  insinuated  that  he 
had  not  been  properly  supported — I  shall  recur  to 
this  further  on — and  the  Secretary  replied  (No.  44), 


to  The  Evolution  of  Myth. 

in  a  few  contemptuous  sentences  which  should 
have  set  the  slander  forever  at  rest.  "You  seek 
(said  he  to  Scott)  to  create  the  belief  that  you  were 
drawn  from  your  quiet  position  in  a  bureau  of  this 
department,  and  assigned  to  the  command  of  our 
armies  in  Mexico  for  the  purpose  of  being  sacri 
ficed;  in  other  words,  that  the  Government,  after 
preferring  you  to  any  other  of  the  gallant  generals 
within  the  range  of  its  choice,  had  labored  to  frus 
trate  its  own  plans,  to  bring  defeat  on  its  own 
armies,  and  to  involve  itself  in  ruin  and  disgrace 
for  an  object  so  unimportant  in  its  bearing  upon 
public  affairs.  A  charge  so  entirely  preposterous, 
so  utterly  repugnant  to  all  the  probabilities  of 
human  conduct,  calls  for  no  refutation."  The  re 
vival  of  the  calumny  shows  that  Governor  Marcy 
relied  too  much  upon  the  good  sense  of  the  people; 
and  I  propose  now  to  supply  the  proof  which  he 
disdained  to  offer. 


In  entering  upon  the  task  of  refuting  the  accusa 
tion,  I  am  met  with  the  difficulty  that  no  evidence 
whatever  has  been  offered  in  support  of  it.  In  the 
nature  of  things  a  negative  is  impossible  of  direct 
proof;  and  the  usual  method  of  proving  that  a  thing 
is  not  so,  is  by  contradicting  the  evidence  that  it 
is  so.  But  the  charge  that  Scott  was  sent  out  to 
slaughter  Taylor  is  supported  only  by  the  affirma- 


The  Evolution  of  Myth.  II 

tion  that  there  is  "  no  doubt"  of  it;  and  the  allega 
tion  that  Scott  said  he  had  been  promised  reinforce 
ments  and  supplies  which  were  never  sent,  is  not 
supported  even  by  that  kind  of  corroboration.  Such 
a  mode  of  fastening  a  great  crime  upon  respectable 
men  surprised  me  not  a  little,  until,  long  after  this 
article  was  in  hand,  I  met  with  the  following 
extracts  from  a  panegyric  upon  General  Grant, 
which  sheds  some  light  upon  his  method  of  dealing 
with  truth. 

u  To  any  one  who  knew  much  of  Grant's  pecu 
liar  mental  traits  it  would  be  quite  easily  believed 
that  when  Grant  had  asserted  either  matter  of  fact 
or  opinion,  he  quite  naively  assumed  that  the  bur 
den  of  proof  was  on  him  who  questioned  it.  *  * 
*  *  His  quiet  but  undoubting  confidence  in  him 
self  was  one  of  the  conditions  of  his  great  success. ' '  * 

One  great  advantage  which  this  peculiar  mental 
trait  secures  to  its  possessor  is,  that  if  the  person 
whom  he  assails  happens  to  be  in  his  grave — as  is 
the  case  in  the  present  instance — the  burden  of 
proof  is  very  apt  to  rest  where  puts  it.  Neverthe 
less  I  feel  impelled  to  undertake  the  task  of  vindi 
cation  even  with  the  burden,  and  am  confident  I 
shall  be  able,  even  thus  handicapped,  to  make  my 
case  clear. 


*  Quoted  iu  Notes  on  the  Personal  Memoirs  of  P.  H.  Sheri 
dan  by  Brevet  L,t.  Col.  C.  McClellan,  page  29. 


The  Myth  in  Chrysalis. 


THE  MYTH  IN  CHRYSALIS. 

The  first  allegation  in  order  of  time  is  that 
General  Taylor  was  u  selected  for  his  lack  of  politi 
cal  ambition  "  to  command  the  first  army  in  Mexico; 
the  "army  of  occupation,"  as  it  was  called.  The 
fact  is  that  General  Taylor  was,  when  so  selected, 
and  had  been  for  the  five  years  preceding,  stationed 
in  Louisiana  with  a  considerable  military  force,  in 
command  of  the  first  military  department,  com 
prising  five  Southwestern  States  ;  and  he  was,  by 
perhaps  a  thousand  miles,  nearer  to  the  threatened 
frontier  than  any  other  department  commander 
who  could  have  been  spared  for  the  same  duty. 
He  had  also  commanded  with  success  in  the  Black 
Hawk  and  Seminole  wars.  But  General  Grant's 
"quiet  but  undoubting  confidence  in  himself" 
assures  him  he  knows  the  true  ground  of  the  selec 
tion,  and  that  it  was  for  political  ends. 

It  is  insinuated  that  Taylor  would  have  been  sus 
pended  after  his  victories  had  begun  to  render  him 
formidable  in  the  political  field,  but  that  "all  the 
capable  officers  of  the  requisite  rank  belonged  to 
the  opposition."  Now,  the  Army  Register  for 
1846,  page  28,  contains  a  list  of  general  officers, 
twelve  in  number;  in  the  order  of  rank,  Taylor  is 
eleventh  on  the  list  Among  these  are  Jesup, 
Wool,  and  Worth,  all  Democrats  so  far  as  they  had 


The  Myth  in  Chrysalis.  13 

any  politics ;  all  capable  officers,  and  all  of  them 
served  in  the,  field  in  the  Mexican  war.  Wool  and 
Worth  won  distinction  at  the  head  of  troops ;  and 
Jesup  was  at  the  front  as  Quartermaster-General. 
He  had  commanded  in  the  Serninole  war,  and  in 
the  Creek  troubles  in  Alabama.  Before  the  Presi 
dent  promoted  Taylor  over  all  the  brigadiers, 
Jesup  and  Wool  were  his  seniors,  and  if  either  of 
them  had  been  sent  to  join  him  with  reinforce 
ments  after  his  first  victories,  Taylor  would  have 
been  superseded  by  mere  operation  of  law,  and  a 
Democrat  placed  in  command. 


Now,  let  us  see  what  was  the  course  of  the  Ad 
ministration  toward  Taylor.  The  moment  the 
news  of  his  first  victories  reached  Washington  the 
President  gave  him  the  brevet  of  major  general 
(No.  i) — the  highest  rank  in  the  Army — and  gave 
him  the  command  of  all  the  forces  then  and  there 
after  to  be  directed  against  Mexico  (No.  3).  A 
democratic  Congress  voted  him  thanks  and  a  gold 
medal,  and  created  an  additional  office  of  major 
general,  to  which  the  President  forthwith  ap 
pointed  him.  The  President  is  represented  as  re 
fusing  to  give  the  command  in  Mexico  to  General 
Scott,  lest  he  should  make  political  capital,  and 
yet  he  did  his  best  to  enhance  the  effect  of  Taylor's 
victories  by  heaping  honors  upon  him.  In  addi- 


14  The  Myth  in  Chrysalis. 

tion,  he  addressed  General  Taylor  a  letter,  in  terms 
of  the  most  glowing  praise,  and  directed  him  to 
publish  it  to  the  army  under  his  command,  and 
thus  to  the  whole  country  (No.  i). 

This  was  on  the  3Oth  of  May,  1846.  Immedi 
ately  thereafter,  June  8th  (No.  2),  the  Secretary  of 
War  consulted  him  as  to  the  advisability  of  ''strik 
ing  a  blow  at  the  city  of  Mexico, ' ' and  asked  whether 
it  could  be  reached  from  the  north;  and,  without 
waiting  for  a  reply,  the  Secretary  on  the  Qth  of 
July  (No.  5)  suggested  it  could  be  best  reached  by 
way  of  Vera  Cruz,  which  could  be  easily  captured, 
and  from  which  port,  he  said,  a  fine  carriage  road 
led  to  the  capital.  And  he  asked  General  Taylor's 
views  as  to  such  an  expedition.  To  the  first  letter 
Taylor  replied  under  date  of  July  2d  (No.  4),  and  to 
the  second  letter,  under  date  of  August  ist  (No.  6). 
He  said  the  city  of  Mexico  could  not  be  reached 
from  the  north  and  by  land,  and  with  regard  to 
the  suggested  expedition  by  way  of  Vera  Cruz  he 
could  give  no  opinion,  either  as  to  its  practicability 
or  as  to  the  force  it  would  require.  "The  Depart 
ment  of  War"  (he  said)  "must  be  much  better 
informed  than"  he.  But  he  thought  his  army 
could  reach  San  Luis  Potosi,  and  had  no  doubt  the 
occupation  of  that  city  would  bring  proposals  of 
peace. 

The  Secretary  of  War  then  proposed,  September 
2d  (No.  7),  to  capture  Tampico,  which  General  Tay- 


The  Myth  in  Chrysalis.  15 

lor  had  said  ' '  would  be  important  to  the  occupation 
of  San  Luis  Potosi,"  150  miles  distant,  and  asked 
General  Taylor's  views  as  to  that  enterprise.  This 
letter  was  intercepted  by  the  enemy  and  did  not 
reach  General  Taylor.  On  the  22d  of  September 
(No.  9),  the  Secretary  wrote  that  it  was  proposed 
to  take  Tampico,  and  that  to  save  time  General 
Patterson  (who  was  on  the  Rio  Grande  while  Tay 
lor  had  advanced  far  into  the  interior)  would  be 
directed  to  hold  himself  in  readiness  to  proceed 
immediately  unless  his  withdrawal  would  interfere 
with  General  Taylor's  operations.  In  reply,  Octo 
ber  1 2th  (No.  10),  General  Taylor  briefly  said  that 
the  attack  on  Tampico  would  be  contrary  to  the  con 
vention  which  he  had  entered  into  on  the  capture 
of  Monterey,  and  by  which  he  had  agreed  not  to 
advance  beyond  a  certain  point  for  eight  weeks  ; 
and  three  days  later,  in  a  letter  dated  October  i5th 
(No.  n),  he  entered  fully  into  the  subject  of  an  ad 
vance  into  the  provinces  of  Tamaulipas  and  San 
Luis  Potosi,  which  he  discouraged,  and  begged  that 
at  least  his  army  might  not  be  required  to  co-oper 
ate  in  it  just  then.  Continuing,  he  said: 

u  It  may  be  expected  that  I  should  give  my  views 
as  to  the  policy  of  occupying  a  defensive  line,  to 
which  I  have  above  alluded.  I  am  free  to  confess 
that  in  view  of  the  difficulties  and  expense  attend 
ing  a  movement  into  the  heart  of  the  country,  and 
particularly  in  view  of  the  unsettled  and  revolu 
tionary  character  of  the  Mexican  Government,  the 


1 6  The  Myth  in   Chrysalis. 

occupation  of  such  a  line  seems  to  me  the  best 
course  that  can  be  adopted.  The  line  taken  might 
either  be  that  on  which  we  propose  to  insist  as  the 
boundary  between  the  republics — say  the  Rio  Grande 
— or  the  line  to  which  we  have  advanced,  viz.,  the 
Sierra  Madre,  including  Chihuahua  and  Santa  Fe. 
:::  *  *  Should  the  Government  determine  to 
strike  a  decisive  blow  at  Mexico,  it  is  my  opinion 
that  the  force  should  land  near  Vera  Cruz  or  Alva- 
rado;  and  after  establishing  a  secure  depot,  march 
thence  on  the  capital.  The  amount  of  troops  re 
quired  for  this  service  would  not  fall  short  in  my 
judgment  of  25,000  men,  of  which  at  least  10,000 
to  be  regular  troops." 

And  then  later  on  he  said: 

"  I  feel  it  due  to  my  position  and  to  the  service 
to  record  my  protest  against  the  manner  in  which 
the  Department  has  sought  to  make  an  important 
detachment  from  my  command,  specifically  indicat 
ing  not  only  the  general  officers,  but  to  a  consider 
able  extent  the  troops,  that  were  to  compose  it. 
While  I  remain  in  command  of  the  army  against 
Mexico,  and  am,  therefore,  justly  held  responsible 
by  the  Government  and  the  country  for  the  conduct 
of  its  operations,  I  must  claim  the  right  of  organiz 
ing  all  detachments  from  it,  and  regulating  the 
time  and  manner  of  their  service.  Above  all  do  I 
consider  it  important  that  the  Department  of  War 
should  refrain  from  corresponding  directly  with  my 
subordinates,  and  communicating  orders  and  in 
structions  on  points  which,  by  all  military  precept 
and  practice,  pertain  exclusively  to  the  General  in 
chief  command." 


The  Myth  in  Chrysalis.  17 

Before  this  letter  could  reach  Washington,  the 
Secretary  wrote  the  General  on  the  22d  of  October 
(No.  12)  that  the  expedition  against  Vera  Cruz  was 
determined  on  if  he  could  spare  the  necessary  force  ; 
and,  if  so,  he  might  organize  it  under  the  com 
mand  of  General  Patterson.  In  reply,  November 
1 2 tli,  (No.  14)  General  Taylor  thought  the  capture 
of  Vera  Cruz  should  not  be  attempted  with  less  than 
10,000  men  ;  4,000  might  probably  effect  a  landing 
and  carry  the  city,  but  they  could  do  no  more  and 
might  be  overpowered  by  a  large  force  of  the  enemy. 
After  capturing  Tampico,  for  which  he  was  pre 
paring,  he  could  spare  4,000  men,  but  the  rest  must 
come  from  the  States.  Tampico  was  soon  after 
captured  by  the  navy  alone. 


Now,  let  us  consider  the  situation.  General  Tay 
lor  had  advanced  125  miles  beyond  the  Rio  Grande 
— to  Saltillo — and  considered  it  important  to  hold 
that  position.  Under  the  most  favorable  circum 
stances  an  exchange  of  letters  required  six  weeks  ; 
a  longer  time  was  usual,  and  letters  were  liable  to 
be  intercepted  by  the  enemy,  as  they  had  been 
more  than  once  and  their  bearers  killed.  He  was 
in  command  of  all  the  troops  everywhere  in  Mexico, 
and  he  claimed  the  right  to  make  all  detachments 
from  his  army,  designate  the  officers  to  command 
them,  and  to  regulate  the  time  and  manner  of  their 


1 8  The  Myth  in   Chrysalis. 

service.  On  this  he  had  insisted  in  his  letter  of 
October  151!!  (No.  n),  and  he  repeated  it  in  letters  of 
December  i4th  (No.  21)  and  December  26th  (No.  25). 
The  Administration  had  in  September  proposed  to 
Mexico  to  open  negotiations  for  peace,  and  Mexico 
had  refused  to  entertain  the  proposition  (No.  9). 
It  was  clear  that  no  amount  of  warring  in  the  re 
mote  and  thinly  settled  provinces  would  compel 
Mexico  to  entertain  proposals  for  peace,  and  that 
an  expedition  against  the  capital  was  of  absolute 
necessity.  But  how  could  General  Taylor  direct 
that  expedition  while  he  was  at  such  a  distance  at 
once  from  the  base  of  supplies  and  from  the  scene 
of  operations?  And  then  he  had  never  approved 
of  the  expedition;  still  less  intimated  a  willingness 
to  command  it.  And  indeed,  if,  as  General  Grant 
doubted  not,  General  Taylor  "looked  upon  the 
enemy  as  the  aggrieved  party,"  there  was  good 
reason  for  his  reluctance  to  advise  or  to  command 
the  expedition,  or  even  to  have  his  army  engaged 
in  it* 

On  the  other  hand,  General  Scott  was  anxious 
for  service  in  the  field.  In  May  he  had  applied  for 
the  command  of  Taylor's  army — "the  principal 
army  against  Mexico"  -  then  (May  27),  "or  at  any 
better  time  (the  President)  may  be  pleased  to  des 
ignate,"  and  on  September  I2th  (No.  8)  he  had  re- 


*  General  Grant  declares  that  the  way  in  which  the  war  was 
forced  upon  Mexico  was  wholly  unjustifiable,  pp.  54,  55. 


The  Myth  in  Chrysalis.  19 

minded  the  President  of  his  said  application,  and 
remarked  that  he  had  reason  to  believe  his  presence 
at  the  head  of  the  army  in  the  field,  in  accordance 
with  his  rank,  was  "neither  unexpected  nor  un- 
desired  by  that  gallant  and  distinguished  com 
mander."  Six  weeks  later  he  had  become  a 
convert  to  the  scheme  of  an  expedition  to  the  capi 
tal  via  Vera  Cruz.  In  a  memoir  of  October  27th 
(No.  13)  he  said:  "To  conquer  a  peace  I  am  now 
persuaded  that  we  must  take  the  city  of  Mexico  or 
place  it  in  imminent  danger  of  capture,  and  mainly 
through  the  city  of  Vera  Cruz."  And  in  a  subse 
quent  memoir  of  November  i2th  (No.  15)  he  said: 
"Until  recently  I  had  concurred  in  the  opinion  of 
others  that  Mexico  might  be  compelled  to  propose 
reasonable  terms  of  accommodation  by  the  time  we 
had  conquered  the  advantages  our  arms  have  now 
obtained. ' '  And  in  subsequent  memoirs  of  Novem 
ber  1 6th  (No.  1 6)  and  2ist  (No.  17)  he  recommended 
the  withdrawal  of  more  than  half  of  Taylor's  army 
for  the  expedition  of  Vera  Cruz,  and  urged  its 
practicability.  It  has  been  shown  above  that  the 
Department  had  long  before  come  to  a  decision  on 
the  subject,  and  that  the  only  question  was  whether 
the  requisite  force  could  be  had,  and  that,  in  turn, 
depended  upon  the  number  that  Taylor  could  spare. 
Scott  calculated  that  Taylor  would  have  before 
long  27,500  men  under  his  command;  he  thought 
14,000  of  these  could  be  spared  for  the  Vera  Cruz 


2O  The  Myth  in  Chrysalis. 

expedition,  leaving  13,500  for  the  advance  on  San 
L,uis  Potosi.  * '  To  meet  this  double  invasion  (he 
said)  Mexico  must  either  divide  her  forces  and 
increase  our  chances  of  success  on  both  lines,  or 
double  her  forces  on  one  and  leave  the  other  com 
paratively  open  to  our  advance. ' ' 

And  so  ultimately  it  turned  out.  Mexico  con 
centrated  her  forces  against  Taylor  and  suffered  a 
crushing  defeat  at  Buena  Vista;  but  acting  a  little 
more  vigorously  than  Scott  perhaps  expected,  Santa 
Anna  came  upon  Taylor  before  he  had  received  the 
reinforcements  which  were  to  make  his  army  up  to 
13,500,  But  in  justice  to  Scott,  it  must  be  said,  and 
presently  will  be  shown,  that  he  did  not  intend 
Taylor  should  advance  until  he  should  have  re 
ceived  those  reinforcements. 


On  the  i8th  of  November  the  President,  in  per 
son,  communicated  to  General  Scott  his  orders  to 
take  command  of  the  army  in  Mexico,  which  were, 
a  few  days  later,  embodied  in  written  instructions 
from  the  Secretary  of  War,  dated  November  23, 
1846  (No.  19).  On  the  same  day  Scott  had  handed 
the  Secretary  a  draft  of  the  instructions  which  he 
desired  to  be  given  him  by  the  Department  (No.  18), 
which,  however,  the  Department  did  not  adopt. 
In  view  of  the  charges  I  am  considering,  it  may  be 
well  here  to  note  that  in  the  latter  Scott  desired  to 


The  Myth  in  Chrysalis.  21 

be  instructed  to  organize  and  conduct  an  expedition 
against  Vera  Cruz,  and  to  draw  troops  from  Taylor's 
army,  only  u  taking  care  to  leave  with  him  a  suffi 
cient  force  to  defend  Monterey  and  to  keep  his  line 
of  communication  open,  say,  to  Camargo  and  thence 
down  the  Rio  Grande  to  its  mouth, ' '  This  passage 
shows  that  he  knew  he  was  expected  not  to  endan 
ger  Taylor;  and  I  will  anticipate  the  course  of  my 
narrative  to  say  that  six  weeks  after  Scott  left 
Washington  the  Secretary,  hearing  disquieting  ru 
mors  respecting  the  concentration  of  a  Mexican 
force  in  Taylor's  front,  wrote  General  Scott,  under 
date  of  January  4,  1847  (No.  29),  communicating 
his  anxiety  and  making  all  the  suggestions  a  civil 
ian  could  make  on  such  a  subject.  Among  these 
was  an  opinion  that  Taylor  ought  not  to  extend  his 
line  to  Saltillo,  in  which  Scott  concurred  and  so 
wrote  to  Taylor  January  26th  (No.  32).  Again,  on 
the  22d  of  March,  the  Secretary,  having  heard  of 
Santa  Anna's  advance,  but  not  yet  of  his  defeat, 
wrote  to  General  Scott  (No.  37)  of  his  anxiety,  and 
urged  him  to  provide  for  Taylor's  safety  even,  if 
necessary,  by  sending  back  troops  from  Vera  Cruz. 
I  think  these  extracts  will  convince  every  fair- 
minded  man  that  Governor  Marcy,  so  far  from  de 
siring  that  General  Taylor  should  be  slaughtered, 
was  doing  all  he  could  do  to  secure  his  safety.  I 
proceed  now  to  speak  of  Scott's  conduct  towards 
Taylor. 


22  The  Myth  in  Chrysalis. 

LeavingWashington  November  23d  General  Scott 
repaired  to  New  York,  whence  he  addressed  a  con 
fidential  letter  to  Taylor,  dated  November  25th  (No. 
20),  in  which  he  stated  his  expectation  of  being  by 
the  23d  of  December  at  Camargo  on  the  Rio  Grande 
("within  easy  corresponding  distance  of  you"), 
and  suggested  that  they  might  later  on  meet 
"somewhere  in  the  interior  of  Mexico."  He  re 
gretted  he  should  have  to  reduce  Taylor  temporarily 
to  the  necessity  of  standing  on  the  defensive ;  his 
own  expedition  could  not  be  delayed,  because  he 
must  take  Vera  Cruz  before  the  yellow  fever  season 
set  in.  But  more  volunteers  had  been  called  for; 
Congress  had  been  asked  for  more  regulars,  "and 
long  before  the  spring  (March)  it  is  probable  you 
will  be  in  a  condition  to  resume  offensive  opera 
tions.  ' '  To  this  letter  Taylor  replied  in  one  marked 
unofficial  (No.  25),  in  which  he  said  "at  all  times 
and  places  I  shall  be  happy  to  receive  your  orders, 
and  to  hold  myself  and  troops  at  your  disposition." 
From  New  Orleans,  and  again  on  arriving  at  Ca 
margo,  where  Scott  found  that  Taylor  was  at 
Victoria,  some  200  miles  to  the  south,  he  addressed 
Taylor  letters  under  dates  of  December  20,  1846 
(No.  22),  and  January  3,  1847  (No.  27),  in  which 
he  explained  more  fully  his  plans,  and  in  the  last, 
repeated  that  Taylor  would  be  "  reduced  for  a  time 
to  the  strict  defensive. ' '  On  the  same  day  he  wrote 
to  General  Butler  (No.  28),  ordering  him,  "without 
waiting  to  hear  from  General  Taylor,"  to  send  to 


The  Myth  in   Chrysalis.  23 

the  Brazos  for  embarkation  to  Vera  Cruz  about 
9,000  men.  Notwithstanding  General  Taylor  had 
only  a  week  before  placed  himself  and  troops  at 
the  disposition  of  General  Scott,  and  Scott  was  his 
superior  officer,  General  Taylor  declared  he  was 
' '  mortified  and  outraged  ' '  at  his  interference  with 
his  command,  and  strongly  resented  it  in  a  letter  to 
General  Scott,  dated  January  15,  1847  (No.  31). 
He  complained  that  he  had  been  kept  in  ignorance 
of  the  designs  of  the  Government,  and  had  evi 
dently  lost  its  confidence,  and  he  would  have  been 
much  better  satisfied  had  he  been  relieved  of  com 
mand  or  allowed  to  retire  from  the  field ;  and  the 
expectation  which  seemed  to  be  entertained  that 
he  could  assume  offensive  operations  by  March  or 
even  May  was  * '  preposterous. ' '  Even  to  hold  a 
defensive  line  he  had  less  than  a  thousand  regulars 
and  a  volunteer  force  mostly  of  new  levies,  while 
an  army  of  more  than  20,000  men  was  in  his  front. 
He  did  not  say  he  could  not  hold  the  defensive 
line.  On  the  contrary,  in  a  letter  written  some 
days  later,  January  27th  (No.  33),  to  the  Adjutant 
General,  with  instructions  to  submit  it  to  the  Sec 
retary  of  War,  to  be  by  him  laid  before  the  Presi 
dent,  he  said:  "The  force  with  which  I  am  left  in 
this  quarter,  though  greatly  deficient  in  regular 
troops,  will  doubtless  enable  me  to  hold  the  posi 
tion  now  occupied." 

The  sum  of  the  matter  is,  that  whereas  Scott 
was  directed  to  leave  Taylor  enough  troops  to  de- 


24  The  Myth  in  Chrysalis. 

fend  him  behind  the  walls  of  Monterey,  which  was 
the  most  advanced  position  he  was  expected  or  de 
sired  to  maintain,  he  in  fact  left  him  strong  enough 
to  meet  the  enemy  in  the  open  field,  fifty  miles  in 
advance  of  that  position,  and  to  gain  a  great  and 
decisive  victory. 

At  a  later  period,  in  April,  1847,  reinforcements 
were  to  be  sent  forward  to  Scott  to  enable  him  to 
advance  upon  Mexico.  They  were  by  previous 
arrangement  sent  to  the  Brazos,  a  point  within  the 
limits  of  his  command,  and  there  came  under  his 
orders.  In  the  instructions  given  by  General  Scott, 
April  25th  (No.  39),  to  the  commanding  officer 
there,  to  forward  them  on  to  Vera  Cruz,  he  made  it 
u  conditional  on  the  safety  of  the  line  of  the  Rio 
Grande,"  and  left  it  to  his  "  own  sound  judgment 
to  determine  on  the  spot"  whether  that  line  would 
be  too  much  exposed  by  the  withdrawal  of  the 
troops  in  question. 

On  the  whole,  I  conclude  that  General  Scott  was 
as  little  desirous  to  expose  Taylor  to  slaughter  and 
defeat  as  the  President  and  Secretary  were  that  he 
should  do  so. 


I  pass  now  to  the  second  branch  of  the  subject — 
the  treatment  of  General  Scott  by  the  Administra 
tion. 

It  is  charged  that  the  President  and  Secretary  of 


The  Myth  in  Chrysalis.  25 

War.  in  pursuance  of  a  plan  to  disgrace  General 
Scott,  withheld  one-half  of  the  men  and  munitions 
of  war  which  he  had  estimated  to  be  necessary  for 
the  success  of  his  expedition,  and  which  they  had 
promised  him  with  expressions  of  "sincere  good 
wishes."  And  the  charge  is  repeated  in  connection 
with  the  expedition  to  Vera  Cruz,  for  which,  it'  is 
said,  Scott  had  less  than  12,000  men  when  he  was 
promised  a  much  larger  force. 

The  only  estimates  of  troops  ever  made  by  Gen 
eral  Scott  were  in  his  four  memoirs  of  October  27th 
and  November  i2th,  i6th,  and  2ist  (Nos.  13,  15,  16, 
and  1 7).  In  these  he  stated  that ' '  to  place  the  capture 
of  both  places  beyond  the  probability  of  a  failure  ' ' 
(both  places,  the  city  and  castle)  "an  army  of  at 
least  10,000  men"  was  indispensable.  Personally 
he  would  be  willing  to  attempt  it  with  a  smaller 
army,  but  doubted  whether  the  Government  ought 
to  risk  it  with  less  than  12,000,  perhaps  15,000  men. 
In  the  instructions  hereinbefore  referred  to,  which 
he  drafted  and  proposed  the  Secretary  should  give 
him  (No.  1 8),  the  Secretary  was  to  tell  him  that 
though  he  (Scott)  thought  15,000  not  an  unreason 
able  number  of  troops  for  the  expedition,  and  10,000 
the  minimum,  ' '  you  are  yet  of  opinion  that  the 
expedition  ought  to  go  forward  even  with  the  first 
8,000  men  that  may  be  embarked  off  Point  Isabel, 
sooner  than  incur  the  danger  of  losing  your  men 
and  object  by  the  yellow  fever  in  consequence  of 


26  The  Myth  in  Chrysalis. 

waiting  too  long  for  either  of  the  larger  numbers 
you  have  mentioned."  The  Secretary  declined  to 
give  the  instructions  asked  or  to  name  any  force 
whatever,  but,  as  we  shall  presently  see,  left  it  to 
Scott  himself  to  decide  what  force  he  could  take 
from  Taylor,  and  what  he  should  take. 

And  in  the  first  letter  he  wrote  Taylor  after 
reaching  New  Orleans,  dated  December  2oth  (No. 
22),  General  Scott  said  that  while  15,000  men  were 
desirable,  I  ' {  am  now  inclined  to  move  forward  to 
the  attack  should  I  be  able  to  assemble  the  5,000 
regulars,  and,  say,  three  of  volunteers."  We  have 
seen  that  Taylor  thought  the  city  alone  might 
possibly  be  taken  by  4,000  men.  Scott,  from  his 
draft  of  23d  November,  and  his  letter  of  2Oth  De 
cember,  appears  to  have  determined  to  make  the 
attempt  if  he  could  get  no  more  than  8,000  men. 
And  in  these  calculations  he  expected  to  encounter 
20,000  or  30,000  men  on  landing  at  Vera  Cruz,  or 
even  double  that  number  if  Mexico  could  arm  so 
many;  and  to  land,  u  no  doubt,  under  heavy  fire" 
(No.  15). 

In  the  instructions  which  he  drafted  for  the  Secre 
tary  to  give  him,  he  was  to  be  directed  to  organize 
an  expedition  against  Vera  Cruz,  and  to  make  up 
the  expeditionary  force  from  the  army  of  General 
Taylor  and  from  nine  regiments  of  volunteers  which 
had  recently  been  called  for,  but  had  not  yet  been 
organized.  The  Secretary  declined  to  give  him 


The  Myth  in  Chrysalis.  27 

such  unconditional  orders.  In  the  instructions 
which  he  did  give  (No.  19)  he  directed  Scott  to 
organize  the  expedition,  u  if  on  arriving  at  the 
theatre  of  action  you  shall  deem  it  to  be  practi 
cable.  It  is  not  proposed  (he  continues)  to  control 
your  operations  by  definite  and  positive  instruc 
tions,  but  you  are  left  to  prosecute  them  as  your 
judgment,  under  a  full  view  of  all  the  circum 
stances,  shall  dictate."  And  finally,  he  hoped  Gen 
eral  Scott  would  have  the  requisite  force  to  accom 
plish  the  objects  in  view,  but  "  of  this  you  must 
be  the  judge  when  preparations  are  made,  and  the 
time  for  action  has  arrived. ' ' 

The  sources  of  supply  stated  in  the  draft  of  in 
structions  were  the  nine  new  regiments  of  volun 
teers  and  Taylor's  army  in  the  field,  which  last  by 
his  seniority  of  rank  and  his  assignment  to  command 
became  absolutely  his  own,  whether  he  went  on  to 
Vera  Cruz  or  not.  The  volunteers  he  thought  might 
begin  to  arrive  '  *  off  Point  Isabel  say  about  the 
middle  of  January."  uSuch  (he  makes  the  Secre 
tary  say  to  him)  are  your  own  (Scott's)  calcula 
tions."  Thus,  then,  a  large  army  was  actually 
given  him,  and  a  force  had  been  called  for  in  addi 
tion,  which  he,  knowing  perhaps  better  than  the 
Secretary,  the  process  of  organizing  volunteers 
calculated  would  be  with  him  in  January.  He  ex 
pected  to  take  from  the  two,  14,000  men,  as  stated 
in  his  memoir  of  November  i6th  (No.  16),  and  he 


28  The  Myth  in  Chrysalis. 

still  expected  so  many  when  he  reached  New  Or 
leans;  for  he  wrote  General  Butler  to  send  him  from 
Taylor's  army  9,100  men,  and  he  expressed  his  in 
tention  elsewhere  to  take  five  regiments,  say  5,000 
men  of  the  new  volunteers;  but  for  reasons  which 
I  do  not  find  stated,  the  whole,  when  assembled, 
amounted  not  to  14,000,  but  only  to  12,000  men, 
and  with  these  he  proceeded  to  Vera  Cruz,  landing 
with  no  enemy  to  oppose  him,  and  without  hearing 
a  hostile  shot  except  from  the  castle,  and  he,  of 
course,  took  care  to  land  far  beyond  the  range  of 
its  guns. 

General  Grant  says  Captain  Alburtis  was  killed 
in  landing.  General  Scott  in  his  dispatch  of 
March  r2th  says  the  landing  was  effected  "without 
accident  or  loss, ' '  and  that  Alburtis  and  many  oth 
ers  were  killed  two  days  after  "in  extending  the 
line  of  investments  around  the  city. ' ' 


It  is  manifest,  from  the  circumstances  and  con 
ditions  of  the  case,  that  it  is  impossible  that  Gen 
eral  Scott  could  have  had  the  promise  of  any  troops 
whatever.  He  was  given  the  actual  command  of 
all  the  troops  in  service,  and  as  to  the  volunteers 
all  the  President  could  do  was  to  call  for  them, 
which  he  certainly  had-  done  before  Scott  was 
assigned  to  command,  and  the  orders  for  sending 
them  forward  were  given  by  General  Scott  himself 
(No.  24).  And  then,  in  all  the  correspondence  be- 


The  Myth  in  Chrysalis.  29 

tween  Scott  and  the  Department,  we  look  in  vain  for 
any  reference,  either  by  Scott  or  the  Secretary,  to  any 
promise  by  the  Department  of  troops,  or,  indeed, 
of  anything  else.  In  his  draft  of  instructions  Gen 
eral  Scott  speaks  of  what  he  had  recommended,  but 
never  of  what  the  President  had  promised.  And 
what  is  conclusive  is  this:  During  the  campaign  in 
Mexico  he  got  into  difficulties  with  his  subordi 
nates,  and,  as  the  President  would  not  court-martial 
them,  he  asked  to  be  relieved ;  and  after  the  city 
was  taken  and  the  enemy  subdued  he  was  relieved. 
This  and  some  other  things  stung  him  to  frenzy, 
and  he  sat  down  and  drew  a  long  indictment  against 
the  Department  (No.  43),  which  I  shall  have  occa 
sion  to  review  at  length,  charging  the  Secretary 
with  numerous  manifestations  of  hostility  to  him, 
and  sundry  neglects  and  disappointments;  but 
never  once  did  he  say  that  the  Secretary  had 
made  or  had  broken  a  promise.  The  only  place  in 
that  long  letter  where  the  word  ' ( promised ' '  is 
used  is  in  a  misquotation  from  one  of  his  own  let 
ters,  in  which  the  actual  word  was  "informed." 

As  for  troops  for  subsequent  operations,  it  is 
sufficient  to  say  that  the  largest  number  ever  esti 
mated  by  General  Taylor  for  the  campaign  against 
the  capital  was  25,000,  and  the  largest  number 
ever  named  by  General  Scott  in  his  various  memoirs 
or  elsewhere  was  20,000,  and  though  with  his  usual 
caution  he  added  that  more  might  be  needed,  he 


30  The  Myth  in   Chrysalis. 

named  no  greater  number.  Now,  he  must  have 
had  in  all  36,000  or  37,000  men;  for  he  had  in 
November,  1847,  32>I56  men,  as  stated  in  the  Adju 
tant  General's  report  and  the  annual  report  of  the 
Secretary  of  War  at  the  next  session  (Nos.  51,  50), 
and  he  had  lost  many  men  in  battle,  and  had  dis 
charged  at  least  3,700  volunteers  after  reaching  the 
interior  (No.  50).  So  that  as  regards  men,  it  is 
simply  impossible  that  the  President  and  Secretary 
could  have  ever  made  any  promises  to  General  Scott 
that  were  not  fulfilled,  or  any  promises  at  all,  or 
that  General  Scott  ever  could  have  said  they  did  ; 
and  finally  it  is  certain  that  they  gave  him  nearly 
twice  as  many  men  as  he  had  ever  asked  for. 


I  have  had  occasion  to  say  that  General  Scott  did, 
in  fact,  make  certain  charges  against  the  President 
and  Secretary,  and  I  must  add  that  these  charges 
were  somewhat  of  the  nature  of  those  which  Gen 
eral  Grant  has  repeated  (No.  43).  In  all  essential 
features,  however,  they  were  false,  and  their  falsity 
was  exposed  in  an  immediate  reply  by  the  Secre 
tary  of  War  (No.  44).  General  Scott's  letter  and 
Governor  Marcy's  reply  were  printed  by  Congress 
in  the  same  document  (Doc.  59,  H.  R.,  1847-8), 
and  I  think  I  may  say  that  only  very  careless  read 
ing  or  wilful  blindness  could  fail  to  see  that  the 
refutation  was  perfect.  The  friends  of  General 


Myth  in   Chrysalis.  31 

Scott  had  been  content  for  thirty  years  to  let  his 
mistake  lie  in  the  quiet  obscurity  of  a  Congres 
sional  document,  and  his  political  opponents,  mind 
ful  of  his  great  services  to  his  country,  have 
felt  no  disposition  to  disturb  its  rest.  But  to 
the  politician  the  individual  is  as  nought  in  com 
parison  with  the  party,  and  the  soldier  is  accus 
tomed  to  sacrifice  friends  that  foes  may  perish  with 
them.  And  there  is  abundant  evidence  in  the 
"Personal  Memoirs"  that  General  Grant  cared 
nothing  for  General  Scott,  besides  the  disservice  he 
has  done  him  in  producing  him  as  a  witness  against 
Governor  Marcy,  and  most  unjustifiably  making 
the  issue  that  either  Scott  lied  or  Marcy  was  a 
traitor;  for  that,  in  plain  words,  is  just  as  General 
Grant  puts  it.  I  hope  to  show  that  he  has  not  the 
authority  of  General  Scott  for  any  such  position. 
The  internal  evidence  is  conclusive  that  General 
Grant's  authority  for.  what  Scott  said  is  derived 
exclusively  from  Scott's  published  dispatches,  and 
particularly  from  the  accusatory  letter  above  re 
ferred  to,  and  in  disposing  of  the  charges  made  in 
that  letter  I  dispose  of  those  made  by  General 
Grant  on  General  Scott's  alleged  authority.  But 
it  is  a  matter  of  sincere  regret  to  me  that  this 
scheme  of  defence  renders  inevitable  the  exposure 
of  some  of  the  errors  and  weaknesses  of  General 
Scott,  who,  in  spite  of  glaring  faults,  had  some 
great  and  many  estimable  qualities. 


32  The  Myth  in   Chrysalis. 

General  Scott,  in  conduct  and  conversation,  was 
as  pure  as  a  woman,  and  strangely  enough,  great 
soldier  as  he  certainly  was,  his  weaknesses  were 
distinctively  feminine.  His  pride  in  his  fine  figure 
was  manifested  only  too  often.  His  fondness  for 
display  and  finery  have  been  shown  np  in  the 
Personal  Memoirs,*  and  his  dispatches  contain  ex 
amples  of  an  aimless  quernlonsness,  not  perhaps 
elsewhere  to  be  found  in  masculine  correspondence. 
In  his  reports  he  bewails  the  delays  and  mishaps  due 
to  the  elements  on  a  stormy  coast  and  in  a  stormy 
season,  and  disclaims  his  responsibility  for  them  in 
a  tone  that  suggests  the  responsibility  must  rest 
somewhere.  And  so  in  his  accusatory  letter  he  com 
plains  that  only  so  many  supplies  came,  implying, 
but  not  at  all  asserting,  that  others  ought  to  have 
come.  It  is  these  incomplete  complaints  that  have 
misled  General  Grant's  eager  credulity,  and  he  has 
formulated  them  in  the  shape  which  he  would  fain 
make  us  believe  General  Scott  intended  to  give  them ; 
that  is,  that  what  mishaps  General  Scott  met  with, 
the  Administration  had  undertaken  to  avert,  and  had 
wilfully  failed  to  do  so;  and  what  he  failed  to  re 
ceive,  the  Administration  had  undertaken  to  supply, 
and  had  purposely  withheld. 

*  This  is  done  with  a  touch  of  humor,  notwithstanding  Gen 
eral  Grant's  Scotch  blood.  And  there  is,  too,  a  spice  of  sarcasm 
in  his  apophthegm,  that  nothing  so  popularizes  a  candidate  for 
high  civil  position  as  military  victories. 


The  Myth  in  Chrysalis.  33 

There  were  four,  and  only  four,  complaints  in 
that  letter  having  any  reference  to  "men  and  ma 
terial.  ' '  Two  of  them  are  contained  in  the  following 
paragraph  : 

' '  The  embarkation  was  delayed  in  whole  or  in 
part  from  the  i5th  of  January  to  the  9th  of  March, 
leaving,  it  was  feared,  not  half  the  time  needed  for 
the  reduction  of  Vera  Cruz  and  its  castle  before  the 
return  of  the  yellow  fever.  But  half  the  surf-boats 
came  at  all,  and  of  the  siege  train  and  ordnance 
stores  only  about  one-half  had  arrived  [at  Vera 
Cruz]  when  the  Mexican  flags  were  replaced  by 
those  of  the  United  States  on  those  formidable 
places  [the  city  and  castle].  We  succeeded  at  last 
in  reaching  the  point  of  attack  in  the  midst  of 
frightful  northers,  by  means  in  great  part  of  trading 
craft,  small  and  hazardous,  picked  up  accidently  at 
the  Brazos  and  Tampico,  and  when  the  army  got 
ashore  its  science  and  valor  had  to  supply  all  de 
ficiencies  in  heavy  guns,  mortars,  and  ordnance 
stores  ' '  (No.  43). 

This  paragraph  contains  the  only  mention  made 
in  the  letter  of  surf  boats,  siege  train,  and  ordnance 
stores,  and  the  letter  nowhere  indicates  how  many 
or  much  ought  to  have  arrived,  or  who  was  re 
sponsible  for  their  failure  to  arrive.  But  as  the 
whole  letter  is  devoted  to  an  arraignment  of  the 
Administration,  the  casual  reader  would  understand 
that  the  failure  was  to  be  imputed  to  the  War  De 
partment;  yet  General  Scott,  while  certainly  willing 
to  be  so  understood,  does  not  say  so ;  and  it  is  left 


34  The  Myth  in  Chrysalis. 

for  General  Grant  to  boldly  interpret  it  into  an 
allegation  that  the  Secretary  had  promised  him  a 
certain  supply  of  guns  and  ordnance  stores,  and 
furnished  only  half. 

Now,  as  it  turned  out,  the  surf  boats,  which  were 
constructed  at  a  cost  of  $130,000,  solely  for  the  pur 
pose  of  landing  the  army  at  Vera  Cruz  on  the  single 
occasion,  were  not  needed  at  all ;  and  of  the  siege 
train  and  ordnance  stores  twice  as  many  mortars 
and  twenty  times  as  many  shells  reached  him  at 
Vera  Cruz  before  the  surrender  as  he  had  occasion 
to  use.  He  was  enabled  to  complain,  with  truth, 
that  only  about  half  had  been  received  by  having 
asked  for  five  times  as  many  guns  and  forty  times 
as  many  shells  as  were  needed,  and  twice  as  many 
of  both  as  could  possibly  be  made  and  delivered  in 
time  to  be  of  use. 

But  to  be  more  specific,  General  Scott  expected 
that  on  arriving  at  Vera  Cruz  he  would  find  a 
Mexican  army  of  at  least  25,000  men  ready  to 
oppose  his  landing  (No.  15.)  He  therefore  asked 
for  140  surf  boats,  so  that  he  could  put  ashore  at  a 
single  instant  5,000  men,  who,  under  cover  of  the 
fire  of  the  fleet,  could  make  good  their  footing  on 
land.  These  boats  he  thought  would  cost  $200 
apiece;  in  fact  they  cost  $960  (No.  44).  And  they 
were  all  promptly  forwarded  to  him,  for  he  men 
tions  in  a  letter  of  February  28  (No.  36),  that 
General  Jones,  the  Adjutant  General,  had  written 


The  Myth  in  Chrysalis.  35 

him  that  all  had  been  shipped.  But,  as  I  have 
said,  no  surf  boats  were  needed  at  all,  because 
there  was  no  enemy  on  the  beach,  or  within  a  hun 
dred  miles  of  the  beach,  except  the  small  garrison 
of  Vera  Cruz,  who  wisely  kept  within  their  walls. 
The  whole  army  could  have  been  landed  in  the 
boats  of  the  fleet.  But  General  Scott  took  no 
risks. 

As  regards  the  siege  train  and  ordnance  stores,  it 
was  General  Scott's  business  to  order  them,  and  he 
said,  on  the  i6th  of  November,  that  he  would  do 
so  on  that  day  (No.  16),  and  he  ordered  50  large 
mortars  and  4,000  tons — say  eighty  or  one  hundred 
thousand — shells  (No.  44).  When  the  Chief  of  Ord 
nance  received  this  requisition  he  at  once  pro 
nounced  it  "preposterous."  The  shells,  he  said, 
were  enough  to  bury  Vera  Cruz  in  iron,  and  he 
knew  the  vast  order  could  not  be  filled  in  time. 
Nevertheless,  as  was  his  duty,  he  submitted  it  to 
the  Secretary,  and  the  Secretary  ordered  that  it  be 
complied  with  u  as  far  as  practicable"  (No.  44). 
All  the  mortars  were  made  and  shipped,  and  67,000 
shells,  as  shown  by  the  report  of  the  Ordnance  De 
partment  accompanying  the  President's  annual 
message  of  December,  1847.  General  Scott  says 
about  half  were  received.  Half  would  be  25  mor 
tars  and  at  least  40,000  shells  ;  but  his  report  from 
Vera  Cruz  (No.  45)  shows  that  only  23  mortars 
reached  him,  and  there  must  have  been,  if  not 


36  The  Myth  in  Chrysalis. 

40,000,  then  30,000,  shells.  That  all  did  not  reach 
him  the  Secretary  attributed  to  the  fact  that  at  that 
day  the  iron  foundries  depended  for  their  heavy 
freighting  upon  the  rivers  and  other  water-ways  of 
the  interior,  and  these,  in  the  dead  of  winter,  were 
frozen  (No.  44).  But  23  mortars  and  at  least  30,000 
shells  reached  Vera  Cruz  in  time  for  the  siege  (No. 

45). 

As  soon  as  ten  of  these  mortars  were  placed  in 
battery,  the  firing  upon  the  city  began,  and  these 
ten  mortars,  with  the  aid  of  two  batteries  of  24- 
pounders — one  of  these  constructed,  armed,  and 
worked  by  the  sailors  of  the  fleet — accomplished 
the  capture  of  Vera  Cruz  and  its  castle  (Nos.  45 
and  46).  And  these  several  batteries  threw  alto 
gether  2,500  solid  shot  and  shells  (No.  46);  so  that 
if  the  mortars  were  fired  as  rapidly  as  the  guns 
(which  they  were  not),  the  ten  mortars  would  have 
thrown  1,140  shells,  and  the  twelve  other  guns 
1,360  solid  shot.  And  the  conclusion  is  that  Gen 
eral  Scott,  in  asking  for  50  mortars  and  80,000  shells, 
asked  for  five  times  as  many  mortars  and  seventy 
times  as  many  shells  as  he  found  need  for.  And 
when  he  said  the  science  and  valor  of  the  army 
"  had  to  supply  all  deficiencies  in  heavy  guns,  mor 
tars,  and  ordnance  stores, ' '  he  actually  had  on  hand 
twice  as  many  mortars  and  thirty  times  as  many 
shells,  and  probably  six  times  as  many  heavy  guns, 
as  he  found  use  for.  As  to  the  heavy  guns,  indeed 


The  Myth  in  Chrysalis.  37 

the  information  is  not  so  specific.  Forty-four  were 
issued  according  to  the  ordnance  report  above  quoted, 
and  he  must  have  asked  for  them,  but  he  had  only 
six  in  battery.  He  never  complained  that  any  had 
failed  to  reach  him.  The  other  38  may  have  been 
lying  on  the  beach  with  the  unused  mortars,  while 
valor  and  skill  supplied  their  place. 


Another  charge,  to  which  great  prominence  is 
given  in  the  letter  of  complaint,  is  that  ten  trans 
ports,  which  General  Scott  had  requested  to  have 
sent  out  in  ballast  from  Atlantic  ports,  to  carry 
troops  from  the  Brazos  and  Tampico  to  Vera  Cruz, 
and  which  the  Secretary  had  ordered  to  be  so  sent, 
never  came.  "Relying  upon  them,  confidently, 
(he  says  in  No.  43),  the  embarkation  was  delayed 
in  whole  or  in  part  at  the  Brazos  and  Tampico 
from  the  i5th  of  January  to  the  9th  of  March, 
leaving,  it  was  feared,  not  half  the  time  needed 
for  the  reduction  of  Vera  Cruz  and  its  castle  before 
the  return  of  the  yellow  fever."  (No.  43.)  The 
order  had  indeed  been  given,  and  the  vessels  never 
came  !  but  why  ? 

"  Forseeing  at  Washington  (he  says  in  No.  43) 
that  from  the  great  demands  of  commerce  at  the 
moment,  it  would  be  difficult,  if  not  impossible, 
to  take  up,  perhaps  at  any  price,  a  sufficient  num 
ber  of  vessels  at  New  Orleans  and  Mobile  to 


38  The  Myth  in  Chrysalis. 

transport  the  regiments  of  my  expedition  from 
the  Rio  Grande  frontier  to  Vera  Cruz,"  he  had 
made  the  request,  and  the  order  was  given.  But 
General  Scott  at  Washington  was  not  in  a  position 
to  know  as  well  as  the  Quartermaster  General  at 
New  Orleans,  what  vessels  could  be  had  at  the  latter 
point.  He  had  himself  advised  that  the  ships  "be 
not  chartered  until  the  troops  are  known  to  be 
nearly  in  position  to  embark"  (No.  16),  and  the 
Secretary,  while  out  of  abundant  caution,  giving 
the  order  December  i5th,  had  previously  (Decem 
ber  nth)  written  to  General  Jesup  at  New  Orleans 
to  know  whether  it  would  be  necessary  to  send  out 
vessels  in  ballast,  which  he  said  would  be  enor 
mously  expensive. 

When  this  letter  reached  New  Orleans,  General 
Scott  was  there,  and  saw  and  read  it;  and  in  a  letter 
to  the  Secretary  (No.  23)  so  informed  him,  and  re 
marked  upon  certain  matters  concerning  transpor 
tation.  General  Jesup  replied  (No.  26):  "Trans 
portation  can  be  provided  here  for  all  the  troops 
that  may  be  drawn  from  the  army  under  the  com 
mand  of  General  Taylor.  *  *  *  The  public 
transports  *  *  *  it  is  estimated,  will  carry  3,000 
men  with  all  their  supplies.  Vessels  can  be  char 
tered  here  on  favorable  terms  for  any  additional 
transportation  that  may  be  required."  General 
Scott  saw  this  letter  before  it  was  sent,  and  marked 
on  it  "read,"  and  noted  his  concurrence  in  certain 


The  Myth  in  Chrysalis.  39 

recommendations  made  on  another  subject.  On 
receipt  of  this  letter  by  the  Secretary,  he,  of  course, 
countermanded  his  order  to  send  vessels  around  to 
New  Orleans  in  ballast.  On  the  26th  of  January, 
when,  according  to  his  letter  of  complaint,  he  had 
been  waiting  eleven  days — since  the  i5th — for  the 
ten  vessels,  General  Scott  wrote  to  the  Secretary 
(No.  32):  "The  Quartermaster  General  (Brevet 
Major  General  Jesup)  at  New  Orleans  has,  I  find, 
taken  all  proper  measures,  with  judgment  and 
promptitude,  to  provide  everything  depending  on 
his  department  for  the  dispatch  and  success  of  my 
expedition.  Transports,  casks  filled  with  water, 
&c.,  &c.,  are  accordingly  expected  to  arrive  here 
[the  Brazos]  and  off  Tampico  before  the  yth  of  the 
next  month. ' '  Not  a  word  is  said  of  the  ten  vessels, 
and  no  mention  is  made  of  any  delay. 

On  the  29th  General  Scott  wrote  to  General  Pat 
terson  at  Tampico  (No.  34) :  ' '  Transports  have  been 
taken  up  at  New  Orleans  for  all  the  troops  who 
are  to  compose  my  expedition,  and  embark  here 
[Brazos]  and  at  Tampico. ' ' 

On  the  1 2th  of  January  (No.  30)  he  had  written 
to  General  Brooke,  in  command  at  New  Orleans, 
that  the  troops  who  were  to  embark  at  Brazos  and 
Tampico  would  not  ' '  reach  those  points  till  late 
in  the  present  month — say  about  the  25th."  In 
the  same  letter  he  directed  General  Brooke  to  take 
particular  care  in  causing  all  ships  which  were  to 


40  The  Myth  in  Chrysalis. 

join  him  to  be  provided  with  fuel  and  water  for 
sixty  or  ninety  days.  "The  water  of  the  Rio 
Grande  [he  added]  is  not  good  for  drinking,  and 
there  would  be  great  difficulty  in  obtaining  it. 
Spare  casks  of  Mississippi  water  on  board  ships 
without  troops  may  be  easily  shifted  to  the  trans 
ports  with  men  and  horses. ' ' 

If  there  was  any  delay,  some  of  it  was  due  to  this 
order.  For  on  February  ist  he  wrote  from  Brazos 
to  Captain  Saunders,  of  the  Navy  (No.  35):  u  I  may 
be  detained  here  several  days  longer  waiting  for 
the  transports  to  receive  the  troops  in  this  neighbor 
hood  and  at  Tampico,  and  those  ships  I  know  are 
detained  at  New  Orleans,  waiting  for  water  casks, 
in  the  hands  of  coopers. ' '  This  is  all  that  he  says 
about  the  detention  or  the  cause  of  it.  But  how 
utterly  impossible  it  renders  his  allegation  that  he 
delayed  the  embarkation  waiting  for  the  ten  vessels 
to  arrive. 

But  this  is  not  all.  The  delay  is  said  to  have 
extended  from  the  i5th  of  January  to  the  gth  of 
March.  Now,  I  have  quoted  above,  from  his  letter 
of  1 2th  January,  that  the  troops  to  embark  at 
Brazos  and  Tampico  were  not  expected  to  reach 
those  points  before  the  25th,  and  other  reports  show 
that  they  did  not.  Then,  on  the  9th  of  March, 
when  they  are  said  to  have  embarked  at  Brazos, 
the  whole  army  landed  at  Vera  Cruz.  When  they 
embarked  I  cannot  state,  nor  is  it  material,  but  be- 


The  Myth  in  Chrysalis.  41 

fore  the  Qth  of  March  they  had  crossed  the  Gulf  of 
Mexico,  in  sailing  vessels,  uin  the  midst  of  fright 
ful  northers,"  and  had  in  the  meantime  rendez 
voused  at  L,obos.  General  Grant  says  the  voyage 
was  tedious,  and  "many  of  the  troops  were  on 
shipboard  thirty  days."  So  it  is  certain  they  did 
not  land  at  Vera  Cruz  on  the  same  day  they  left 
Brazos. 


I  have  already  said  that  in  none  of  General  Scott's 
letters,  not  even  in  that  devoted  to  an  enumeration 
of  "the  neglects,  disappointments,  injuries,  and 
rebukes  which  [had]  been  inflicted ' '  upon  him  by 
the  War  Department  (No.  43),  is  it  alleged  that  any 
troops  had  been  promised  him  by  the  War  Depart 
ment;  still  less  that  he  did  not  receive  all  that  he 
expected.  He  did,  however,  complain  that  certain 
troops  under  General  Cadwallader,  which  he  had 
expected  to  be  sent  to  Vera  Cruz,  had  been  sent  to 
Brazos,  and  that  the  want  of  them  had  crippled  his 
operations.  To  this  Governor  Marcy  replied  that 
he  had  given  no  orders  on  the  subject;  that  before 
General  Scott  left  for  Mexico  he  had  himself 
arranged  that  all  the  troops  sent  to  him  should 
report  at  the  Brazos,  which  place  was  within 
the  limits  of  his  command,  and  it  was  in  pur 
suance  of  that  arrangement  that  they  were  sent 
thither.  It  is  true  that  in  advising  General  Scott 


42  The  Myth  in  Chrysalis. 

of  their  departure  for  that  point  (No.  37),  the  Sec 
retary  had  spoken  of  the  reports  of  General  Taylor's 
critical  position,  and  the  succor  which  the  troops 
would  be  in  a  position  to  afford  him;  for  though 
this  was  a  month  after  the  battle  of  Buena  Vista, 
intelligence  of  it  had  not  reached  Washington. 
General  Scott,  in  acknowledging  the  receipt  of  this 
letter  (No.  40),  took  no  exception  to  what  he  after 
wards  called  the  "diversion"  of  those  troops;  and, 
in  ordering  them  on  to  Vera  Cruz,  he  made  the 
order  conditional  upon  their  not  being  needed  by 
General  Taylor.  A  year  later,  when  he  was  seek 
ing  subjects  of  complaint,  this  diversion,  the  effect 
solely  of  his  own  orders,  was  made  to  play  a  most 
important  part.  He  said  a  soldier  [only]  could 
imagine  his  distress  on  hearing  these  troops  had 
been  diverted  to  the  Rio  Grande,  for  had  General 
Cadwallader  not  been  so  delayed,  he  believed  he 
could  have  taken  Mexico  in  June  at  one-fifth  the 
loss  he  afterwards  sustained  in  August  (No.  43).  I 
have  no  doubt  he  could  have  done  so,  and  that  his 
loss  would  have  been,  not  a  fifth,  but  only  a  twenty- 
fifth  of  what  he  sustained  in  August.  And  not 
only  this,  but  it  is  certain  that  without  General 
Cadwallader's  troops  he  could  have  done  the  same. 
For  after  he  had  heard  in  April  that  General  Cad 
wallader' s  troops  were  at  the  Brazos,  and  after  he 
had  ordered  that  officer  to  remain  there  if  he  should 
find  it  necessary  (No.  39),  General  Scott  discharged 


The  Myth  in  Chrysalis.  43 

and  sent  home  3, 700  veteran  volunteers  who  had 
yet  from  four  to  seven  weeks  to  serve,  twice  the 
time  that,  three  months  later,  proved  necessary  for 
the  taking  of  the  city  (No.  47). 

And  now  to  the  proof  of  this: 

On  the  23d  of  April  he  wrote  to  Colonel  Wilson 
at  Vera  Cruz  (No.  38):  u  We  already  occupy  Perote 
and  shall  soon  occupy  Puebla.  Indeed,  we  might 
safely  take  possession  of  Mexico  without  a  loss,  per 
haps,  of  one  hundred  men.  Our  dangers  and  diffi 
culties  are  the  rear."  Santa  Anna  was  eighty 
miles  in  the  rear  of  Scott,  who  was  between  him 
and  the  Capital,  and  he  was  u  without  arms,  maga 
zines  or  military  chest"  (No.  40).  The  Govern 
ment  was  preparing  to  leave  the  city  (No.  39).  But 
having  sent  home  the  volunteers,  Scott  sat  down 
at  Puebla  for  three  months,  while  Santa  Anna 
made  his  way  to  the  Capital,  and,  as  General  Scott 
says,  uhad  time  to  collect,  to  treble,  to  organize 
and  discipline  his  forces,  and  also  to  erect  numerous 
and  powerful  defences,  with  batteries ' '  (No.  43). 
So  that,  instead  of  100  men,  he  lost  2,703  in  taking 
the  city. 

Let  me  make  this  still  plainer.  After  Santa 
Anna  had  been  allowed  three  months  to  make  his 
way  to  the  Capital  and  fortify  it  in  the  manner 
stated,  General  Scott,  resumed  the  offensive  on 
the  7th  of  August,  fought  several  battles,  and  had 
the  city  at  his  mercy  on  the  2oth.  In  his  despatch 


44  ^e  Myth  in  Chrysalis. 

of  August  28th,  giving  an  account  of  a  series  of 
battles  fought  on  the  2oth,  and  several  victories  won 
on  that  day,  he  says  :  '  'After  so  many  victories,  we 
might,  with  little  additional  loss,  have  occupied 
the  Capital  the  same  evening."  But  he  granted  an 
armistice.  Now  the  force  with  which  he  achieved 
the  victories  in  August  was  10,738  men  (No.  49). 
The  force  which  he  had  under  his  command  in 
May,  before  he  discharged  the  volunteers,  must 
have  been  9,000  men.*  It  is  obvious  that  Santa 
Anna's  30,000  men  and  fortifications  far  more  than 
counterbalanced  the  few  hundreds  by  which  General 
Scott  had  increased  his  force,  and  that  he  would 
have  found  it  far  easier  to  take  the  city  in  May,  with 
9,000  men  (which  he  said  he  could  do  with  the  loss 
of  100  men),  than  he  found  it  in  August  with  10,738 
men,  when  his  actual  loss  was  2,703  men,  and  he 
could  have  done  it  quicker.  Or,  if  no  quicker,  he 
could  have  done  it  in  fourteen  days,  the  time 
actually  required,  while  the  volunteers  had  twenty- 
eight  days  or  longer  to  serve. 

Why  he  discharged  the  volunteers  thus  in  ad 
vance  of  the  expiration  of  their  term,  perhaps 
only  a  soldier  can  understand;  but  a  politician 
might  be  pardoned  for  suspecting  that  Scott,  who 
u  was  known  to  have  political  aspirations,"  might 
hope  for  the  votes  of  men  whom  he  thus  released 

*  General  Grant  says  nine  or  ten  thousand  (p.  135). 


The  Myth  in  Chrysalis.  45 

from  an  arduous  and  dangerous  service.  The  rea 
son  he  gave,  that  none  of  them  would  re-engage, 
and  that,  if  retained  to  the  end  of  their  terms, 
they  would  have  to  pass  through  Vera  Cruz  during 
the  yellow  fever  season,  may  be  true,  but  he  could 
have  taken  Mexico  by  the  2oth  of  May  (6+14=20), 
and  the  volunteers  could  have  reached  Vera  Cruz 
considerably  in  advance  of  the  yellow  fever,  which 
ordinarily  arrives  in  June. 


The  rest  of  the  complaints  in  the  accusatory 
letter  refer  mostly  to  the  refusals  of  the  President 
to  appoint  or  promote  officers  whom  he  had  recom 
mended,  and  to  court-martial  others,  of  whom  he 
had  complained.  But  as  these  and  a  few  others 
do  not  concern  the  question  of  reinforcements  and 
supplies,  I  shall  not  report  the  replies  which  Gov 
ernor  Marcy  made  to  them.  There  are,  however, 
two  circumstances  which  shed  such  light  upon  the 
character  of  the  testimony  which  General  Grant 
has  adduced  against  Governor  Marcy,  that  the  de 
fence  would  be  incomplete  without  noticing  them 
both. 

In  his  letter  of  accusation  General  Scott  says: 

u  Only  four  days  were  allowed  me  at  Washing 
ton,  where  twenty  might  have  been  most  advan 
tageously  employed  in  the  great  bureaus,  those  of 
the  Chief  Engineer,  Chief  of  Ordnance,  Chief 


46  The  Myth  in  Chrysalis. 

Quartermaster,   and  Chief  Commissary  of  Subsist 
ence."     (No.  43.) 

For  answef  to  this, Governor  Marcy  quietly  quoted 
a  paragraph  from  the  draft  of  instructions  which 
Scott  had  requested  the  Secretary  to  address  to 
him  (No.  18).  In  this  draft  Scott  desires  the  Sec 
retary  to  say  to  him  : 

"  I  am  pleased  to  learn  from  you  that  you  have, 
in  a  very  few  days,  already,  through  the  general 
staff  of  the  army  here,  laid  a  sufficient  basis  for  the 
purposes  with  which  you  are  charged,  and  that  you 
now  think  it  best  to  proceed  at  once  to  the  south 
west,  in  order  to  organize  the  largest  number  of 
troops  that  can  be  obtained  in  time  for  that  most 
important  expedition." 

Thus,  having  applied  in  writing  for  orders  to  pro 
ceed  to  the  front,  and  assigned  as  a  reason  that  he 
had  done  all  that  was  necessary  at  Washington, 
General  Scott,  in  less  than  fifteen  months  thereafter, 
complained,  also  in  writing,  that  he  had  not  been 
allowed  time  in  Washington  to  complete  his  prepar 
ations. 


The  remaining  incident  had  perhaps  a  more  un 
fortunate  effect  upon  General  Scott's  military  oper 
ations  than  any  that  I  have  mentioned,  and  yet  it  is 
not  alluded  to  in  his  accusatory  letter. 


The  Myth  in  Chrysalis.  47 

The  President,  in  April,  1847,  sent  to  Mexico  Mr. 
N.  P.  Trist,  chief  clerk  of  the  State  Department, 
bearing  a  sealed  dispatch  addressed  to  the  Mexican 
Minister  of  Foreign  Relations,  and  an  order  from 
the  War  Department  directing  General  Scott  to 
have  this  despatch  forwarded  to  its  address  by  flag 
of  truce.  Mr.  Trist  was  also  entrusted  with  a  copy 
of  the  sealed  despatch,  and  a  copy  of  the  treaty  which 
it  was  the  purpose  of  that  despatch  to  propose  to  the 
Mexican  Government,  and  which,  if  accepted  and 
duly  ratified  by  Mexico,  was  to  be  followed  by  a 
suspension  of  hostilities.  Mr.  Trist  was  instructed 
to  exhibit  these  copies  to  General  Scott,  and  when 
the  reply  of  the  Mexican  Government  should  be  re 
ceived,  accepting  and  ratifying  the  treaty,  to  give 
General  Scott  information  to  that  effect,  in  order 
that  he  might  suspend  hostilities,  until  the  treaty 
could  be  submitted  to  the  Senate  for  ratification  on 
the  part  of  the  United  States.  (No.  42.) 

On  reaching  Vera  Cruz,  Mr.  Trist  found  an  op 
portunity  to  forward  the  despatch  and  the  order  to 
General  Scott,  who  was  at  Jalapa,  and  he  followed 
on  soon  after.  And  there  he  received  back  from 
General  Scott  the  sealed  packet  intended  for  the 
Mexican  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  with  a  letter 
in  which  General  Scott  positively  refused  to  for 
ward  it,  for  sundry  reasons,  of  which  not  the  least  po 
tent  was  probably  this:  "  I  see  [wrote  General  Scott 
No.  41]  that  the  Secretary  of  War  proposes  to  de- 


48  The  Myth  in  Chrysalis. 

grade  me  by  requiring  that  I,  the  Commander  of 
this  Army,  shall  defer  to  you,  the  chief  clerk  of  the 
State  Department,  the  question  of  continuing  or 
discontinuing  hostilities."  And  he  claimed  that 
"  armistice  or  no  armistice  is  most  peculiarly  a  mili 
tary  question,"  and  that  if  the  enemy  should  enter 
tain  the  overtures,  that  question  should  be  referred 
to  him. 

Accordingly,  when  ready,  he  advanced  upon  the 
City  of  Mexico,  and  after  a  succession  of  battles, 
fought  on  the  aoth  of  August,  in  all  which  he  was 
victorious,  he  granted  the  enemy  an  armistice  with 
a  view  to  negotiate  a  peace.  u  After  so  many  vic 
tories  [writes  General  Scott,  No.  48]  we  might,  with 
but  little  additional  loss,  have  occupied  the  Capital 
the  same  evening.  But  Mr.  Trist,  commissioner, 
&c.,  as  well  as  myself,  had  been  admonished  by 
the  best  friends  of  peace, ' '  not  to  drive  away  the  gov 
ernment,  and,  by  taking  the  Capital,  excite  a  spirit 
of  national  desperation;  and  so  he  granted  a  military 
armistice,  of  which  the  Mexicans  availed  themselves 
with  such  diligence  that  when  hostilities  were  re 
sumed  it  cost  General  Scott  a  loss  of  1,651  men  be 
fore  he  could  enter  the  city.  The  instructions  of 
the  War  Department  were  that  hostilities  should 
cease  only  after  negotiations  should  have  been 
brought  to  an  end  by  the  acceptance  by  Mexico 
of  the  terms  offered,  and  by  the  ratification  by 
Mexico  of  a  treaty  embodying  them,  whereas  Gen- 


The  Myth  in  Chrysalis.  49 

eral  Scott  granted  an  armistice  in  order  to  enter 
upon  negotiations,  with  the  result  that  the  negoti 
ations  were  availed  of  by  the  Mexicans  only  to 
amuse  the  Americans,  and  cost  them  the  heavy 
loss  I  have  stated. 

The  reader  will  probably  be  surprised  that  Gen 
eral  Scott  adduced  the  authority  of  Mr.  Trist  on 
the  ' '  peculiarly  military  question  ' '  of  armistice.  I 
must,  therefore,  mention  that  after  a  correspond 
ence,  quite  as  acrid  on  Mr.  Trist' s  part  as  on 
General  Scott's,  the  "  chief  clerk  of  the  Depart 
ment  of  State ' '  and  ' '  the  Commander  of  this 
Army"  had  suddenly  conceived  the  highest  admi 
ration  for  each  other,  and  become  fast  friends.  * 

*  This  correspondence  is  a  curiosity  of  literature.  The  writers 
contend  which  shall  say  the  bitterest  things,  and  each  in  his 
own  proper  style.  The  soldier  is  blunt  and  abusive ;  the  diplo 
mat  smooth  and  sarcastic.  Scott  was  tempted  to  return  Trist's 
"farrago  of  insolence,  conceit,  and  arrogance"  to  the  writer, 
who,  if  he  had  "but  an  ambulatory  guillotine,  would  be  the 
personification  of  Daiiton,  Marat,  and  St.  Just  all  in  one."  Trist 
acknowledged  "the  amiable  affability  and  gracious  condescen 
sion"  of  Scott,  whose  "outward  acts  of  respect  for  the  Govern 
ment"  [he  said]  "bear  the  same  relation  to  this  sentiment 
which  genuflections  and  upturnings  of  the  eyes  bear  to  reli 
gion."  (Doc.  60,  pp.  813-25,  996.) 


50  The  Evolution  of  the  Myth. 


THE  EVOLUTION  OF  THE  MYTH. 

The  evolution  of  the  myth  from  the  facts  which 
constituted  its  chrysalis  condition  was  effected 
solely  by  General  Grants  imagination,  aided,  per 
haps,  somewhat  by  his  logical  faculty.  If  General 
Scott  had  received  one-half  the  siege  trains  and 
ordnance  stores,  reason  suggested  there  must  have 
been  a  whole,  and  imagination  added  that  the 
whole  was  the  quantity  promised.  And  when 
reason  suggested  there  must  have  been  a  motive 
for  withholding  the  half,  imagination  added  that 
the  motive  was  to  disgrace  Scott  lest  he  should 
by  success  win  a  reputation  that  would  render  him 
a  formidable  rival  for  the  Presidency.  And  in 
this  way,  and  in  this  way  only,  is  constructed 
against  President  Polk  and  his  Secretary  of  War 
the  charge  of  a  crime  exceeding  in  atrocity,  I 
verily  believe,  any  that  history  records — the  crime, 
namely,  of  sending  ten  thousand  men  to  death  by 
pestilence  and  hostile  arms,  in  order  that  their  com 
mander  might  be  disgraced  by  the  failure  of  the 
enterprise  in  which  they  were  engaged. 

Wisely  did  the  great  moralist  of  the  last  century 
and  of  our  age  say  :  "Among  the  calamities  of 
war  must  be  reckoned  the  diminution  of  a  regard 
for  truth."  And  the  reason  is  not  far  to  seek. 
The  necessity  of  deceiving  one's  enemies  and, 


Conclusion.  51 

almost  as  often,  one's  friends,  and  the  habit  of  look 
ing  for  success  only  to  force  and  stratagem,  and  never 
to  justice  or  reason  ;  in  short  the  fundamental  con 
viction  of  the  soldier  that  on  whichever  side  may 
be  the  right,  ( '  Heaven  is  always  on  the  side  of 
the  heaviest  artillery,  "  must  depreciate  the  war 
rior's  estimate  of  the  value  of  truth,  deaden  his 
faculty  of  apprehending  it,  and  render  him  in 
sensible  to  the  necessity  of  taking  it  into  account 
as  an  element  in  the  consideration  of  any  subject. 

CONCLUSION. 

I  feel  that  I  have  successfully  achieved  my  task, 
and  no  one  who  reads  these  pages  with  a  mind 
open  to  conviction  will  credit  the  charges  made  by 
General  Grant  against  President  Polk  and  Secretary 
Marcy.  But  this  defence  will  not  reach  one  in  a 
million  of  those  who  will  read  the  charges.  Speedy 
oblivion  will  settle  on  this  humble  vindication, 
while  the  great  libel  will  take  its  place  as  a  true 
chapter  in  the  History  of  the  United  States. 

General  Grant's  sarcasm  is  as  true  as  it  is  bitter. 
The  people  honor  the  warrior  who  has  triumphed 
in  fields  of  slaughter,  though  at  home  and  in  civil 
war,  more  than  the  statesman  who  has  rescued  half 
a  continent  from  the  dominion  of  superstition  and 
savagery,  and  given  it  to  enlightened  freedom  and 
peaceful  industry. 


52  References. 


REFERENCES. 

The  following  letters  and  reports  are  found  in 
document  No.  60,  House  of  Representatives,  3oth 
Congress,  ist  Session,  1847-8: 

No-  1846  Page 

1  Secretary  Marcy May  30.     283 

2  Same June  8.     323 

3  General  Scott June  12.  325 

4  General  Taylor July  2.  329 

5  Secretary  Marcy July  9.  333 

6  General  Taylor Aug.  i.  336 

7  Secretary  Marcy Sept.  2.  339 

8  General  Scott , Sept.  12.  372 

9  Secretary  Marcy .Sept.  22.  341 

10  General  Taylor Oct.  13.     350 

11  Same Oct.  15.     351 

12  Secretary  Marcy Oct.  22.  363 

13  General  Scott Oct.  27.  1268 

14  General  Taylor Nov.  12.  374 

15  General  Scott Nov.  12.  1270 

16  Same Nov.  16.   1273 

17  Same Nov.  21.   1274 

18  Same Nov.  23.   1275 

19  Secretary  Marcy Nov.  23.     836 


References.  53 

1846  Page 

20  General  Scott Nov.  25.  373 

21  General  Taylor Dec.  14.  381 

22  General  Scott Dec.  20.  839 

23  Same        Dec.  27.  838 

24  Same Dec.  23.  841 

25  General  Taylor.... Dec.  26.  848 

26  General  Jesup Dec.  27.  568 

1847 

27  General  Scott Jan.  3.  848 

28  Same Jan.  3.  851 

29  Secretary  Marcy Jan.  4.  871 

30  General  Scott Jan.  12.  855 

31  General  Taylor Jan.  15.  862 

32  General  Scott Jan.  26.  865 

33  General  Taylor Jan.  27.  noo 

34  General  Scott Jan.  29.  880 

35  Same         Feb.  i.  882 

36  Same         Feb.  28.  896 

37  Secretary  Marcy , Mar  22.  906 

38  General  Scott Apl.  23.  946 

39  Same        Apl.  25.  950 

40  Same        Apl.  28.  944 

41  Same        May  7.  814 

42  Secretary  Marcy -. May  31.  960 

1848 

45  General  Scott Feb.  24.  1218 

44  Secretary  Marcy Apl.  21.  1227 


54  References. 

The  following  reports  are  found  in  document  No. 
8,  House  of  Representatives,  Thirtieth  Congress, 
First  Session,  1847-8.  President's  Annual  Message. 

No.  1847  Page 

45  General  Scott Mar.  23.     224 

46  General  Bankhead Mar.  28.     243 

47  General  Scott -April  23.     261 

48  Same         Aug.  28.     306 

49  Same         Sept.  18.     375 

50  Secretary  Marcy , Dec.  2.          45 

51  Adjutant-General Nov.  76 

52  Col.  Ordnance Nov.  685 


